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Basu and Foster (1998) characterized a sophisticated literacy measure using five 
axioms. In this paper we argue that if a measure satisfies three of their five axioms, 
namely, anonymity, monotonicity and externality, then also it becomes suitable in 
some applications. We, therefore, introduce two classes of measures whose members 
will satisfy at least these three axioms. Two population principles for intersociety 
literacy comparisons are also suggested and their relationships with the Basu-Foster 
axioms are established. Finally, we illustrate our results numerically using Indian data 
and draw out some policy implications.  
Keywords: literates, isolated illiterates, proximate illiterates, literacy measures, 
illustration, policy implication 
JEL classification: I21  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research 
and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The 
Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural 
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a 
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and 
environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening 
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Work is 
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and 




UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
Printed at UNU-WIDER, Helsinki 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, 
of any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgement 
For comments and suggestions, we are grateful to James E. Foster, Nanak Kakwani 
and other participants of the UNU-WIDER Conference on Inequality, Poverty and 





Literacy is an individual’s first step in knowledge-building. Therefore, literacy figures 
are essential in any quantification of human development. For instance, in the 
construction of the human development index, UNDP (1990-2003) used literacy as 
one of the key indicators of human development. 
The most well-known measure of literacy (MOL) is the literacy rate, the proportion of 
adult population that is literate. However, as pointed out by Basu and Foster (1998), 
this measure ignores the positive impact of the presence of a literate person in a 
household on the illiterate persons of the household. More precisely, this measure 
does not take into account the fact that the illiterate persons of a household can benefit 
from the knowledge of a literate person in the household. The essential idea 
underlying this notion of benefit is that a literate person confers positive externality 
identically on all illiterate persons of the household to which he belongs. In other 
words, within a household literacy can be regarded as something like a pure public 
good, which is characterized by nonrivalry and nonexclusiveness. By nonrivalry we 
mean here that one illiterate person’s benefit from the knowledge of a literate person 
in the household does not reduce the amount of benefit that another illiterate person in 
the same household can derive. On the other hand, nonexclusiveness means that the 
benefit an illiterate member of a household receives from having a literate person in 
the household does not exclude another illiterate person of the household from 
enjoying the same benefit. This kind of intra-household externality can arise in many 
ways. For instance, for filling in an official form an illiterate person can take the help 
of a literate person in the household. 
Now, an illiterate person will belong either to (i) a household that has one or more 
literate persons or (ii) a household that has no literate person. Basu and Foster (1998: 
BF hereafter) referred to the first type of illiterate as a proximate illiterate (since he 
has proximity to literacy because of the presence of a literate person in the household) 
and the second type of illiterate as an isolated illiterate. In order to distinguish 
between these two types of illiterates, BF assumed that each proximate illiterate 
person counts for α  literate persons, where α  is a number lying between zero and 
one and an isolated illiterate is regarded as a ‘zero literate’ person. Thus, in ‘literacy-
equivalent’ terms every proximate illiterate person has a status that lies somewhere in 
between that of complete illiteracy and that of complete literacy. They also suggested 
a measure, the ‘effective literacy rate’ that takes this into account. This measure is the 
usual literacy rate plus α  times the fraction of proximate illiterates in the population. 
BF provided a set of axioms that exactly characterizes the effective literacy rate. 
These axioms are externality, anonymity, monotonicity, normalization and 
decomposability. Externality requires, under ceteris paribus assumption, literacy of a 
population to decrease or remain unaltered according as a split of a household in the 
population is externality-reducing or externality-neutral. A household split is called 
externality-reducing (externality-neutral) if it creates (does not create) isolated 
illiterates. Anonymity demands that any characteristic other than literacy status of 
individuals or household is irrelevant to the measurement of literacy. Monotonicity 
means that the level of literacy of a population rises if, given other things, an illiterate 
person becomes literate. According to normalization, the literacy measure should take 
on the values zero and one in extreme cases of complete illiteracy and complete 
literacy, respectively. Finally, decomposability says that for any partitioning of the 2 
population into subgroups with respect to characteristics like race, region, religion 
etc., the overall literacy of the population is the weighted average of subgroup literacy 
levels, where the weights are the population shares of the subgroups.  
While anonymity, monotonicity and externality are quite appealing, the remaining 
two axioms appear to be debatable to some extent. Any bounded measure of literacy 
can be made to satisfy the normalization axiom under suitable transformations. Sen 
(1992: 106) questioned the appropriateness of a poverty separability condition that 
parallels the decomposability axiom. He believed that one subgroup’s poverty may be 
affected by what happens to other subgroups.1 Clearly, if the literate persons of a 
subgroup can positively affect the literacy status of another subgroup, then the 
appropriateness of the literacy decomposability axiom also becomes questionable. To 
understand this more explicitly, note that one implication of subgroup 
decomposability is that for any society the overall literacy level can be expressed as 
the weighted average of literacy levels of individual households, where the weights 
are the adult population proportions of the respective households. Now, in India, 
particularly in rural areas, a person belonging to an illiterate family usually takes 
literal help from a literate neighbour in many respects, for example, for filling in a 
bank withdrawal form, reading and writing letters and so on. Therefore, in such a 
situation subgroup decomposability does not appear to be a suitable property. While 
we do not wish to claim that normalization and decomposability are always 
undesirable postulates, in view of the above discussion we can probably maintain the 
view that if a literacy index fails to meet these two properties but satisfies the 
remaining three, it cannot be discarded outright and may be suitable in some 
appropriate situations where normalization and decomposability do not hold. 
Therefore, in this paper we first suggest a class of literacy measures whose members 
may or may not satisfy decomposability but satisfies the remaining four axioms. 
Evidently if some member of this class meets decomposability as well, then it must be 
the BF measure. This class can then be extended to a larger class of measures whose 
members will fulfil anonymity, monotonicity and externality but not necessarily the 
other two BF postulates. 
To analyse the BF axioms further, we establish their independence, where 
independence means that none of these axioms implies or is implied by one or more 
of the other four. This shows that none of the BF axioms is redundant for deriving 
their measure. Next, as an extension of the BF exercise, we also propose two 
population principles for comparing literacy across societies. The first principle 
demands that if each household in a society is replicated any number of times, then 
the literacy levels of the original and replicated societies are the same. According to 
the second principle, literacy remains unchanged if replication occurs within all 
households not affecting their number. However, it turns out that decomposability 
along with anonymity implies the first principle. Thus, decomposability subsumes a 
weaker property, the first population principle, within an anonymous framework. 
Analogously, the second principle drops out as an implication of decomposability, 
anonymity and neutral part of externality. However, the reverse implications are not 
true. Note that since the BF index is decomposable, anonymous and invariant to 
                                                 
1  For detailed discussion on the poverty separability axiom, see Anand (1983); Chakravarty (1983, 
1990); Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984); Cowell (1988) and Foster and Shorrocks (1991).   3
externality-neutral splits, it is capable of making intersociety literacy comparison by 
either of the two population principles. The two classes of measures that we suggest 
in this paper also satisfy the two population principles.  
We also illustrate different measures numerically using the national sample survey 
household level data for the rural sectors of seven states in India for the year 1993-93 
and derive some policy implications of intra-household positive externality from 
literacy. It emerges that the literacy ranking of the states by a measure is sensitive to 
the values of α  as well as to the functional forms of measures for the same 
value of α . 
The paper is organized is follows. The following section starts with a discussion and 
demonstration of the BF axioms. Then we discuss the two population principles and 
their analytical relationship with decomposability. Next, we introduce the new classes 
of literacy measures. Section 3 provides the numerical illustration. Finally, section 4 
concludes. 
2  Properties for a measure of literacy, their implications and several new 
measures 
Consider a society consisting of k households that contain n  adults. The literacy 
profile of household h  (h=1,…k) is given by the vector x
h, where 
h
j x , the j-th 
coordinate of x
h, takes on the value 1 or 0 according as the jth member of household h 
is literate or illiterate. When we say that a person is literate, we are assuming that 
he/she has fulfilled some unambiguous criterion for literacy. For instance, according 
to Census of India (1991) a person is regarded as literate if he/she ‘can read or write 
with understanding in any language. However, a person who can merely read but 
cannot write is not literate’. The term ‘society’ is used to refer to the vector of 
household literacy profiles x=(x
1,…,x
k). Evidently, x represents the literacy levels of 
the society as well as a household structure. The literacy profile x
0 associated with x is 
obtained by concatenating the household vectors in x. For instance, consider a society 
of three households with two, three and four adult members respectively. Assuming 
that there is no literate in the first household and that only the first two members of 
the second household and the first member of the third household are literates, we 
have x=((0,0), (1,1,0), (1,0,0,0)) and x
0=(0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0). 
Let D
n be the set of all societies with adult population size n. Note that two arbitrary 
societies in D
n may or may not have the same number of households. The set of all 
possible societies with arbitrary adult population size and number of households is 
D=
n
M n D U ∈ , where M is the set of positive integers. For any function f: D
1 R → , the 
restriction of f on D
n is denoted by 
n f , where  M n∈  is arbitrary and R
1 is the real 
line. For any  M n∈ , 
n D x∈  we write nl(x) for the number of literate persons in the 
society x. For any k-household society (x
1…. x
k) , , M n D
n ∈ ∈ the number of adult 
persons in x








Now, as stated in the introduction, an illiterate person is a member of a household that 
contains either at least one literate person or no literate person. Clearly, in the former 
case the illiterate person can derive literacy benefit from having a literate person in 
the household. We can, therefore, call this person proximate illiterate and regard 
him/her as an  ) 1 0 ( < <α α  literate person. In contrast, in the latter case the illiterate 
person can be called isolated illiterate because he/she does not get any literacy benefit 
from a member of the household. Evidently, α  determines the extent to which a 
literate person’s knowledge is able to help the illiterates literally. As BF argued, the 
value of α  is to be determined from empirical estimation (see also Basu, Foster and 
Subramanian 2000). For any 
n D x∈ , where  N n∈  is arbitrary, the number of 
proximate literates in x is denoted by np(x). 
The effective literacy profile of household h, 
h x ˆ , can be defined as  
h

























q x = 1 for some q ≠  j,  
The society effective literacy profile is given by 
0 2 1 * ) ˆ ,....., ˆ , ˆ (
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j x e x ) ( ˆ . For the purpose at 
hand we need some more preliminaries. For all  N n∈ , 
n D x∈ , we say that  y
n D ∈ is 
obtained from  x by a ‘simple increment’ if 
h
j y =1 and 
h




i x y =  for all 
(r,i)≠ (h,j) and we write yCx to indicate this. That is, the societies x and y are 
identical except that one illiterate person (j) in 
h x is becoming literate in 
h y . We say 
that the (k+1)-household society 
n D y∈  is obtained from the k-household society 
n D x∈  through a household split if some household in x, say r, is broken down into 
two households, which are households r and (r+1) in y, while all the households 
numbered from 1 to (r-1) are the same in x and y, and household h in x is same as 
household (h+1) in y, where h=r+1,…,k. Equivalently, x is obtained from y as 
follows: the households numbered 1 to (r-1) in x are the corresponding households in 
y, household r in x is a concatenation of households r and (r+1) in y, and the h-th 
household in x is the (h+1) th household in y, where h=r+1,…,k.  Thus, 
x
h =, 1 , r h y
h < ≤  
 =y
h T , ,
1 r h y
h =
+  
 = , ,





1 + h y denotes the concatenation of the vectors y
h  and  y
h+1. For the given 









The household split will be called ‘externality-neutral’ if either (i) both y
r and y
r+1 
contain a literate person, or (ii) neither of y
r or y
r+1 contains a literate person. We   5
denote this relationship between x and y by yNx. The split is called ‘externality-
reducing’ if exactly one of y
r and y
r+1 contains a literate person and this is denoted by 
yEx. In the example considered above, the relationship yEx holds. A society 
n D x∈  is 
called ‘completely literate’ if 
h
j x =1 for all j and for all h ; x is ‘completely illiterate’ if 
h
j x =0 for all j and h. 
A measure of literacy H is a real valued function defined on D, that is, H: D 
1 R → . 
Thus, for any 
n D x∈ , where  M n∈ is arbitrary, H
n(x) denotes the extent of literacy of 
the society x.  
BF laid down the following desiderata for a measure of literacy (MOL).  
Anonymity (ANY) 
For all 
n D x M n ∈ ∈ ,,  i f  
n D y∈ is obtained from x by either a reordering of 









For all n∈M, x
n D ∈ , suppose that y
n D ∈ is obtained from x through a household 
split. Then (a) H
n(y)=H
n(x) if yNx holds, and (b) H
n(y)<H
n(x) if yEx holds. 
Normalization (NOM) 
For all n M ∈ , x
n D ∈ , H
n(x)=1 if x is completely literate and H
n(x)=0 if x is 
completely illiterate. 
Subgroup decomposability (SUD) 
For 
i i n n D x ∈
) ( , i=1,2,…m, where 
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Since we have already mentioned these properties in the introduction, and they have 
also been discussed earlier by BF, we skip any further discussion on them here.  
In addition to the above axioms considered by BF, we also suggest the following as a 
postulate for an MOL.  
Principle of population (POP) 
For all n
n D x M ∈ ∈ ,,   H
n(x)=H
mn(y), where y is the society obtained by 
replicating m times each household in x.  6 
According to POP, for an m-fold replication of each household of the society, the 
degrees of literacy of the replicated and the original populations are the same, 
where  2 m ≥  is arbitrary. Thus, POP leads us to view literacy in proportional 
terms. Evidently, POP is helpful for cross population comparisons of literacy. 
An alternative to POP can be the following: 
Alternative population principle (APP) 
For all n
n D x M ∈ ∈ ,,   H
n(x)=H
mn(z), where z is the society obtained from x by 
replicating the individuals within each household m times. 
Given 
n D x∈ , y in POP and z in APP have the same population size mn. But the 
essential difference between y and z is that y has a higher number of households 
than z. In fact, the number of households in y is mk, where k is the common 
number of households in x and z. 
The most commonly used MOL is the literacy rate, the proportion of adult population 
that is literate. Formally, the literacy rate A: D
1 R → is defined as  
A












x n ) ( l , (1) 
where n M ∈ and x
n D ∈ are arbitrary. As observed by BF, A
n satisfies all their axioms 
except part (b) of EXT. It satisfies POP and APP also. 
BF suggested a more sophisticated MOL, the effective literacy rate B: D
1 R → , where 
for all n
n D x M ∈ ∈ ,,  
B












n(x),   (2) 
where P
n(x)=np (x)/n is the proportion of proximate illiterates in x. B
n can be rewritten 
as 
B
n(x) =  α (1-C
n(x))+(1-α ) A
n(x),   (3) 
where C
n(x) is the fraction of isolated illiterates in x. The number 1-C
n(x) gives the 
proportion of population in x with one or more literate persons in the household and is 
equal to A
n(x)+P
n(x). This has also been used as an indicator of literacy (see Rogers 
and Herzog 1966, and Sharma and Retherford 1993). Thus, B
n is a convex mix of the 
two indicators of literacy 1-C
n and A
n, with weights α  and 1-α , respectively. If α =0, 
B
n(x)=A
n(x). On the other hand if 
n B , 1 = α becomes 1-C
n. Subramanian (2000) 
suggested a measure 
n S , which is given by the product of 
n A  and 1-C
n. In the 
particular case 
n A = α , B
n and S
n are related by  )). ( 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( x A x A x S x B
n n n n − = −    7
BF demonstrated that B
n is the only MOL that verifies their five axioms. It meets POP 
and APP also. 
We now show that the five BF axioms are independent. The demonstration involves 
construction of an indicator that will satisfy any four of these axioms but not the 
remaining one. Thus, independence means that if we drop anyone of these five 
axioms then the resulting MOL will not be the BF index. 
Proposition 1: Axioms ANY, MON, EXT, NOM and SUD are independent. 
Proof: 
i)  The measure (1-(C
n(x)) may not satisfy MON but satisfies others. 










not remain unchanged under an externality neutral split, thus violating part 
(a) of EXT. It, however, satisfies the other postulates.  
As observed by BF, A
n(x) violates part (b) of EXT but meets others. 
iii)  The MOL  ) (x B
n δ , where δ >0, δ ≠ 1, does not fulfil the part of NOM that 
corresponds to complete literacy, but fulfils others. The MOL
2
) ( 1 x B
n +
 
meets all properties except the part of NOM which corresponds to complete 
illiteracy. 
iv)  The indicator α (1-C
n ( x))θ +(1-α ) ( A
n  (x))θ , where  1 , 0 ≠ > θ θ , is a 
violator of SUD but not of others. 















) where  i η >0,  j i η η ≠  if  j i ≠ , 
fulfils all the five axioms except ANY.  
The next proposition shows that SUD combined with one or more of the remaining 
BF axioms implies POP and APP.  
Proposition 2: (a) If a literacy measure H : D → R1 satisfies ANY and SUD, then it 
satisfies POP. (b) If a literacy measure H : D → R1 fulfils ANY, SUD and part (a) of 
EXT, then it fulfils APP. 
Proof: 
(a) Suppose society y is obtained by replicating t times all households in x
n D ∈ that 
consists of k households, where household h  with literacy profile
h x includes 
h a individuals giving a total of n individuals for x. Society y, which has a population 
size of tn, is composed of tk households. Let  ) (y H












) ( ) (,  w h e r e  
h y is the literacy profile of household h in y, 
h b is the number of persons in 







. Applying anonymity all the MOLs 






















) ( ) (x H
n = , 
where the last equality is obtained by applying SUD.  ) ( ) ( x H y H
n tn = is precisely the 
requirement of POP. 
(b) Suppose society z is obtained by replicating t times all the individuals in every 
household in society 
n D x∈ . Society x is composed of k households where household 
h with literacy profile 
h x includes  h a individuals, giving a total of n individuals for 
entire x. 
Similarly, society z, by definition, consists of tk households, where household h 
includes  h ta individuals giving a total of tn individuals for entire z. Let  ) (z H
tn  be the 
MOL for z. We can now split each household of  h ta individuals in z into t identical 
households of  h a  individuals to obtain society y. Since the operation is externality 
neutral, in view of part (a) of EXT, we have  ). ( ) ( y H z H
tn tn =  Applying the result in 
part (a) of the proposition, by SUD and ANY, we get  ) ( ) ( x H y H
n tn = , which gives 
) ( ) ( x H z H
n tn = , the requirement of APP.  
It may be important to note that the converse of this proposition is not true. That is, 
POP and APP do not imply the postulates from which they are derived in 
Proposition 2. To see this, note that the MOL in (iv) in the proof of Proposition 1 
verifies POP and APP, but not SUD. Similarly, the MOL in (v) in the same proof 
meets POP and APP but not ANY. Finally, we use the first MOL in (ii) in that proof 
to demonstrate the remaining part of the claim. It is also easy to construct examples 
which will satisfy POP (APP) but not ANY and SUD (ANY, SUD and EXT(a)) 
simultaneously. 
Since the BF index B
n is a convex combination of the MOLs A
n and (1-C
n), a natural 
generalization of B
n can be the same convex combination of a transformation of A
n 
and (1-C
n). More precisely, as a generalization of B we may suggest the use of the 
MOL G: D
1 R →  where for all 
n D x M n ∈ ∈ ,,  
)) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( x A f x C f x G
n n n α α − + − = ,   (4) 
where f: Q
1 R → , with Q being the set of rational numbers in [0,1]. 
The following proposition identifies the class of all real valued functions defined on Q 
for which G verifies NOM and part (b) of EXT.   9
Proposition 3: The general MOL G defined in (4) satisfies normalization and part (b) 
of externality if and only if f (0)=0, f (1)=1 and f is increasing. 
Proof: 
Suppose that A
n(x)=0. This in turn implies that C
n(x)=1. Then  
G
n(x)=α  f (0)+(1-α ) f (0)=f (0).  (5) 
But in this extreme case by normalization G
n(x)=0. This along with (5) gives f(0)=0. 
Next, suppose that A
n(x)=1 which gives C
n(x)=0. Then  
G
n(x)=α  f (1)+(1- α ) f (1)=f (1)   (6) 
But normalization says that G
n(x)=1 in this case. Using this information in (6) we get 
f(1)=1. 
Now, suppose that y has been obtained from x by a household split and the split is 
externality reducing. Then the split decreases the number of proximate illiterates. 
Part (b) of EXT then demands 
G
n(y)= )) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 ( x A f x C f y A f y C f
n n n n α α α α − + − < − + − =G
n(x)(7) 





n(x) means that  )), ( 1 ( )) ( 1 ( x C f y C f
n n − < −  that is, 
)) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( x P x A f y P y A f




n(x), we need 
increasingness of f for the inequality in (7) to hold. This establishes the necessity part 
of the proposition. The sufficiency is easy to verify.2  
Let F be the class of all real valued increasing functions defined on Q that take on the 
values 0 and 1 at 0 and 1, respectively. More precisely, f: 
1 R Q → is a member of F if 
f is increasing, and f(0)=0 and f(1)=1. It is clear that to every f∈F there corresponds a 
different index of the form (4). These indices will differ only in the manner how we 
specify f. For any f∈F, the underlying MOL G
n, in addition to being affirmatively 
responsive to part (b) of EXT and NOM, is anonymous, population replication 
invariant (since A
n and C
n are so), monotonic (since f is increasing) and invariat to 
externality neutral splits. However, G
n may not fulfil SUD. 
Examples of functions which are members of F are 
i)  f1(t)= , 0 , > θ
θ t  
ii)  f2(t)= ), 1 /( ) 1 ( − − e e
t  
iii)  f3(t)=2t/ (1+t). 
                                                 
2   Note that if the household split is externality neutral, then increasingness of f does not follow as a 
necessary condition for EXT to hold. However, if f is increasing then the underlying G
n(x) satisfies 
both parts (a) and (b) of EXT. 10 
Now, the MOL of the form (4) associated with f1 in (i) becomes 
0 , )) ( )( 1 ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( > − + − = θ α α
θ θ
θ x A x C x G
n n n . Clearly for  1 = θ , which gives 
f1(t)=t, 
n Gθ  becomes the BF MOL B
n in (2).Note that for a given society x, which is 
neither completely literate, nor completely illiterate,  ) (x G
n
θ  is decreasing in θ . As 
0 → θ , 1 ) ( → x G
n
θ . 
We will consider the explicit forms of MOLs corresponding to the functions f2 and f3 
specified above in section 3. Clearly, we can have infinitely many functions to choose 
from F. The choice gets widened if in (4) we give up the assumptions f (0)=0 and f 
(1)=1 but retain increasingness of f. In such a case G
n will fulfil ANY, MON, EXT, 
POP and APP, but not NOM and also not necessarily SUD. Let F  be the class of all 
real valued increasing functions defined on Q. Then F⊂ F . Examples of functions that 
belong to F -F can simply be constructed by adding a non-zero constant term to the 
examples given above. That is, if we define gi (t)=fi(t)+ i δ , where  0 ≠ i δ  is a constant, 
i=1,2,3; then 
'
i g  s are members of F -F. 
3  Literacy in rural India: an illustration 
The purpose of this section is to numerically illustrate the measures suggested in 
section 2 of the paper using statewise household level literacy data thrown up by the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) for rural India for the period 1993-94. 
The states considered are Andhra Pradesh (AP), Arunachal Pradesh (AR), Haryana 
(HA), Karnataka (KA), Manipur (MA), Rajasthan (RA), and Sikkim (SI). The literacy 
measures chosen for the purpose are the generalized BF index  θ G , and the measures H2 
and H3, whose restrictions on D




















x A x C
n
n n
α α    (8) 
and 
) ( 1
) ( ) 1 (
) ( 2
)) ( 1 ( 2
















,   (9) 
where  M n∈  and
n D x∈  are arbitrary. It may be noted that H2 and H3 are special cases 
of G in (4), corresponding respectively to the functional forms  F f f ∈ 3 2,  considered in 
section 2. 
Numerical estimates of literacy for rural India for the period considered are presented in 
Table 1. The first column of the table gives the names of the states for which the 
calculations are done. In columns 2 and 3 we show, for each state, the literacy and 
proximate illiteracy rates A and P. (Since interstate comparisons involve different 
population sizes, we drop superscript n from all indices.) Assuming that α =0.25, 
statewise generalized BF index for three different values of θ  (θ =0.5,1.0, and 1.5) are 
presented in columns 4-6. It may be recalled that for θ =1,  θ G  becomes the BF index B.   11
In columns 7 and 8 we show values of H2 and H3 for the same value of α . Columns 9 to 
13 present the values of  θ G  (θ =0.5,1.0, and 1.5), H2 and H3 corresponding to α =0.75. 
Thus, while in the former case a proximate illiterate is equivalent to one fourth of a 
literate, in the latter case we have three-fourth equivalence.  
Several interesting features emerge from the table. For all  2
7C =21 pairwise 
comparable situations we have uniform ranking by all the three measures for α =0.25. 
The same ranking of the states is obtained for  3 H  and  5 . 0 G  for α =0.75 also. For this 
latter value of α , uniform ranking by all measures is generated in 20 cases, a 
disagreement arises for the pair (AP, RA). More precisely, while  3 H  and  5 . 0 G  make 
AP more literate than RA for both α =0.25 and 0.75,  θ G (θ =1.0 and 1.5) and  2 H  
agree (disagree) with this ordering for α =0.25 (0.75). From this observation we can 
conclude two features on literacy ranking. First, alternative measures may generate 
different orderings of societies for the same value of α  (as in the case of α =0.75). 
Second, a change in the value of α  may give rise to a change in ranking by the same 
measures (as  θ G  for θ =1.0,1.5 and  2 H demonstrate this for the pair AP and RA, 
when α  increases from 0.25 to 0.75). This second feature was noted by BF as well. 
Note that for the pair (AP, RA), we have A(AP)>A(RA), but P(AP)<P(RA). The 
dominance of the component α P in the calculation of the MOLs ( θ G forθ =1.0, 1.5 
and  2 H ) for high values of α  may be the underlying factor for the reverse ordering 
generated. However, for the remaining MOLs ( 5 . 0 G  and  3 H ) α P does not become a 
dominant factor. This clearly shows that the ranking of the societies is sensitive to the 
value of α . 
Table 1 
Literacy in rural India, 1993-94 
    Values of index 











































  (A) (P)  θ=0.5  θ=1.0 θ=1.5 H2 H 3  θ=0.5 θ=1.0  θ=1.5  H2 H 3 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13 
Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) 
0.3988 0.4595 0.7052 0.5137 0.3877 0.4116 0.6586 0.8527 0.7434 0.6593 0.6645 0.8354
Arunachal 
Pradesh (AR) 
0.3133 0.5357 0.6501 0.4472 0.3271 0.3552 0.5874 0.8310 0.7151 0.6306 0.6373 0.8080
Haryana  
(HA) 
0.4874 0.4528 0.7660 0.6006 0.4831 0.5012 0.7338 0.9018 0.8270 0.7688 0.7725 0.8907
Karnataka  
(KA) 
0.4799 0.4320 0.7583 0.5879 0.4671 0.4855 0.7249 0.8894 0.8039 0.7362 0.7396 0.8776
Manipur 
 (MA) 
0.6496 0.3212 0.8508 0.7299 0.6318 0.6379 0.8370 0.9405 0.8906 0.8484 0.8490 0.9358
Rajasthan  
(RA) 
0.3431 0.5409 0.6744 0.4783 0.3685 0.3853 0.6178 0.8516 0.7488 0.6736 0.6796 0.8316
Sikkim  (SI)  0.6321 0.3030 0.8381 0.7079 0.6030 0.6100 0.8226 0.9240 0.8594 0.8039 0.8038 0.9185
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A comparison between AR and RA shows that RA has higher values of A and P than 
AR and since the three indices combine increasing transformations of A and P in a 
positive way, RA becomes more literate than AR by all the measures. The same 
phenomenon holds for the pair (HA, KA). For no other pair of states presented in the 
table this characteristic has been found. In such cases we have to consider specific 
indices for literacy ranking of states. 
We conclude this section with some additional observations on the figures presented 
in the table. By all the indices considered, MA turns out to be the most literate state, 
whereas AR has the minimum literacy level. The situations for the remaining states 
are in between these two extremes. It might be of interest to note that although MA 
has the highest proportion of literates, its proportion of proximate illiterates is rather 
low. The converse is true for AR. For many states, the proportion of proximate 
illiterates is significantly greater than the proportion of isolated illiterates. Thus a 
substantial proportion of population in these states has immediate access to literacy 
because of intra-household externality. For each state the excess of an index over the 
literacy rate A shows the quantitative impact of the intra-household externality on 
assessment of literacy. These observations correspond closely to an important policy 
implication. Consider a cost-constrained literacy campaign programme in a region. 
Under the programme one person from each illiterate household can be made literate 
so that other members in the household can take advantage of intra-household positive 
externality from literacy. Since higher number of households can now be covered by 
the programme, the society becomes effective literates to a larger extent, which in 
turn demonstrates a greater success of the programme.   
4 Conclusions 
The results developed in the paper are based on the assumption that within a 
household, literacy can be regarded as a pure public good characterized by nonrivalry 
and nonexclusiveness. That is, all illiterate persons in a household derive literacy 
benefit from the presence of one or more literate person in the household under the 
conditions that no illiterate person in the household can be excluded from getting this 
benefit and one person’s benefit does not reduce the level of benefit for another 
person. As a result, it has been assumed that each illiterate person in a household with 
one or more literates can be regarded as an  ) 1 0 ( < <α α  literate person. Thus, 
irrespective of the number of literate persons in the household, an illiterate person 
becomes an α  literate person. Further, intrinsic to this beneficial connection between 
literates and illiterates is the assumption that there is no constraint on the time that a 
literate person can spend helping illiterates. 
Now, it is quite likely that a higher fraction of literate persons may ensure a greater 
access to literacy skills of illiterates. The time constraint of a literate person is also 
likely to influence this access. Another issue is gender sensitivity to literacy analysis. 
The positive externality generated by literacy is likely to be higher if the source of 
literacy is a female instead of a male. (BF suggested a modification of their measure B 
along this line.) Thus, characteristics other than the sheer existence of a literate person 
in a household may be quite important in determining the value of α .   13
The next point concerns the domain of positive impact that a literate person can have 
on illiterates. In addition to conferring literal benefits to their own household 
members who are illiterate, a literate person may be able to affect positively the 
literacy status of their own society, caste, etc. This will depend on the individual’s 
social connection in the community/caste. Extensions of our analysis along these 
directions will be quite worthwhile.  
Since alternative literacy measures may rank two societies in different directions, 
another line of investigation can be the development of a quasi-ordering such that the 
ranking of the societies by a set of measures satisfying certain postulates will coincide 
with that generated by the ordering. This is left as a future research programme. 
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